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This article analyses the factors behind the paradoxical result of the
Brazilian gun-control referendum. It adopts a qualitative approach to
explore the dissemination of ideologies surrounding crime, gun control
and security. For this purpose, interviews were conducted with activists
involved in the referendum’s campaign. The results reveal that ideolog-
ically driven campaigns in a context of corruption scandals, high levels
of violence and fear influenced the result. The neoliberal discourse of
individual freedoms played a role, as did the phrasing of the referendum’s
question, fragile confidence in public institutions and unequal campaign
funding and regulation.
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Data from the Brazilian Ministry of Health and the United Nations reveal that on
average 38,000 firearms deaths happen in Brazil annually. Between 1980 and 2012
over 880,000 people died from firearm wounds in Brazil, a country with firearm death
rates higher than countries at war (21.9/100,000 inhabitants in 2012 and 47.6/100,000
among the population aged 15–29) (Waiselfisz, 2015). As a point of comparison, the
world’s average homicide rate in the year 2000 was 8.8/100,000; for high-income coun-
tries it was 2.9; for low and middle-income countries it was 10.1 (Bailey and Dammert,
2006).
A decade has passed since the Brazilian Government approved a referendum that
enabled the population to vote onwhether to ban gun sales to civilians. A vote for the ban
was expected to have had a significant impact on the international community and on
gun control policies around the world. Threeweeks before the referendum, campaigners
were allowed prime television time to present their arguments. Prior to the campaign,
opinion polls revealed that 80 percent of the population supported a gun ban (Datafolha,
2005; Anastasia, Inacio and Novais, 2006); however the actual referendum result was
64 percent against a ban as reported by the International Action Network on Small Arms
(IANSA) (IANSA, 2005a).
An analysis of the referendum and of the lessons that can be learned from this event in
Brazil’s history is timely given that the Brazilian gun lobby is now even more organised
than in 2005 and that they have proposed significant legal reforms to Brazil’s gun-control
legislation. Among other changes, the proposed legislation (PL 3722/12) would reduce
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the age requirements for purchasing firearms from 25 to 21 years old, extend the rights
to purchase guns and the amount of ammunition that can be purchased – one person
would be entitled to own up to nine firearms and purchase up to 5400 bullets per
year, creating as Fernandes, Vicente and Silva (2015) put it, ‘a dream’ for the gun and
ammunition industry.
This article investigates the factors that influenced the referendum’s result. It contex-
tualises the development of firearm availability in Brazil and some of the barriers faced
by those who attempt to promote a world with fewer guns and the violence that accom-
panies them. Additionally, it analyses the implications of the discourses of two different
groups: civil society activists promoting an anti-violence agenda, and gun lobbyists.
The research elements for this article included evaluation of 24 in-depth telephone
interviews and open-ended survey questions administered through email between Octo-
ber 2009 and March 2010, with pro-gun and anti-gun campaigners from organisations
in the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) and Brazil. Interviews lasted on aver-
age 45minutes and were recorded when participants consented. Initial participants were
recruited by approaching activists at organisations such as Viva Rio in Brazil and the US
National Riffle Association (NRA). Further participants were recruited through a snow-
balling method. They were asked about the challenges of the referendum’s campaign and
their opinions of why the referendum failed.
In the next section, the article examines some of the existing analyses of the Brazil-
ian gun control referendum, how the referendum came about and the socio-economic
background against which it was set. Subsequently, the article discusses five key themes
that emerged from the interviews that according to activists were important in swaying
the referendum’s result. These include: (a) campaign strategy and funding; (b) the for-
mulation of the referendum’s question; (c) indecision and confusion among voters; (d)
corruption scandals and the politicization of the referendum’s question and (e) the role
of the Electoral Justice System. Finally, the article concludes with a broader discussion
of the discourses deployed at the time of the referendum, and how in the Brazilian con-
text of inefficient public institutions, it became difficult for Brazil’s population to make
a decision about gun control.
The Referendum
A number of studies focused on analysing the Brazilian gun control referendum and
explaining its result. Most explanations emphasized the rarity of public consultations in
Brazil (Anastasia, Inacio and Novais, 2006; Araújo and Santana, 2006; Inacio, 2006;
Lissovsky, 2006). Other explanations focused on the exploitation of fear of crime in the
rhetoric of the televised gun lobby’s campaign, which argued that given the inefficiency
of the Brazilian state in protecting its citizens, a gun ban would leave citizens defenceless
(Mota, 2006; Esteves, 2007; Goldstein, 2007; Veiga and dos Santos, 2008). Although
not focused on the referendum, Borba’s (2012) analysis also suggested that negative
propaganda, such as the exploitation of fear, challenges ideas that political campaigns
do not affect voting intentions.
Maia’s (2009) analysis of newspapers focused on the role of news media in the refer-
endum’s deliberative process and found that contending parts would benefit from taking
into consideration the perspectives and rationales of others. Similarly, Mendonça (2009)
focused on the deliberative process concluding that it is not enough to defend ‘the right
to life’ (pro-ban) or the ‘right to free choice’ (gun lobby). He suggested that what these
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rights constitute must be explained and counter arguments need to address the rationales
of the opposition. As argued by Carvalho (2015) the referendum revealed that pro-ban
campaigners did not adequately address the opposition’s (the gun lobby) arguments.
Indeed, Soares’ (2006a) quantitative study reveals the declining support for the ban
once the televised electoral campaign began. Mota (2006) provides an analysis of this
decline based on the narratives of pro-ban activists. However, none of these studies
combined an analysis of first-hand narratives of activists on both sides of the cam-
paigns. This article addresses this gap in the literature to argue that the discourses of
contending sides involved in networks of activism elicit significant lessons about the
politics of gun control. Moreover, this article provides an interpretation of the referen-
dum’s result, based on the frameworks of Garland (2001), Wacquant (2003, 2009) and
Chevigny (2003).
The theoretical frameworks developed by Garland (2001), Wacquant (2003, 2009)
and Chevigny (2003) facilitate the investigation of the role played by governance and
fear of crime in the referendum’s result. Garland’s (2001) and Wacquant’s (2003, 2009)
key theses focus on the development of punitive states and societies. Garland (2001)
argues that failing hope in the rehabilitation of offenders, coupled with growing anxiety
about crime, leads citizens and governments to advocate the increasing use of criminal
justice interventions. Comparably, Wacquant argues that the neoliberal era champions
more state powers in the penal system as a remedy for the social consequences of its
economic policies, which have caused widespread inequality.
Neoliberal discourse promotes the protection of individual and property rights over
social and public interests. Thus private rather than public forms of security are pri-
oritized. Its preoccupation is with individual and personal safety. Hence scholars have
associated neoliberal governance and its social concomitants with trends in crime and
repressive crime control (Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2003, 2009; Reiner, 2007).
Drawing on neoliberal discourses of individualism, gun lobbyists in Brazil, as in the
US, assiduously cultivate complaints regarding the control of firearms, through a rhetoric
lauding individual liberties and freedoms. The notion that individual freedoms are guar-
anteed by freedom of the market and of trade (even the freedom to own and trade
firearms with few or no regulations) is a chief feature of neoliberal thinking, and it has
long directed the US position in relation to the rest of the world. The freedom it sym-
bolizes and personifies echoes the interests of private property owners, corporations and
financial capital.
Nonetheless, the neoliberal thesis is not fully appropriate for the Brazilian case, inso-
far as the country has seen (mild) reductions in inequality in the 2000s and expanded
spending on education and health (Neri, 2009). The Brazilian case does not follow the
simple US model of welfare withdrawal and penal state development. Violent, often mil-
itarised, repression existed long before the arrival of neoliberalism, which is the focus of
Wacquant’s critique (Chevigny, 1995; Huggins, 1997, 2000; Pinheiro, 2009; Cheliotis
and Xenakis, 2010).
Nevertheless, Wacquant is right to note that growing prison populations and an
emphasis on punitive approaches have become more visible during the neoliberal period.
Chevigny (2003) emphasizes that these developments have been accompanied by the pol-
itics of clientelism in Latin America and the populist ‘tough on crime’ ideology, which
seek to bargain for votes in a context often driven by fear of crime. These frameworks
enable an understanding of how ideologies of crime, criminals and the criminal justice
system as well as the role of the media and of global powers in the gun debate affected
the referendum.
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Background
Between 1980 and 2010, the number of firearm homicide victims in Brazil rose by
346.5 percent while the population grew by 60.3 percent (Waiselfisz, 2013). Over the
same period, the Brazilian firearm industry developed into the second largest producer
in the western hemisphere (IANSA, 2005b). Brazilian small arms manufacturers pro-
duce approximately 250,000 firearms every year (ISP, 2006). Brazil is also a market for
firearms manufactured in other countries, such as the US, China and Russia.
Such an influx of firearms has led to ‘astronomic levels of armed violence’ (Dreyfus,
Lessing and Purcenaa, 2005: 64). This also coincides with growing levels of suicide and
critical costs to public health (Waiselfisz, 2015). Just as Hemenway (2006) and Cook
and Ludwig (2000) have argued in respect of the US, the production, distribution and
purchase of firearms are issues driven largely by private decision-making (corporate and
commercial decisions, and individual consumer choices) with costly social consequences.
The availability of firearms has increased the prevalence of trivial conflicts that result
in lethal violence. Incidents that may previously have involved fists, knives or other
weapons tend now to be played out with guns, leading almost inevitably to more deaths
(Waiselfisz, 2013, 2015). Similarly in the US, it has been argued that from the 1970s,
the pace of non-lethal violence has slowly increased, while the pace of lethal adolescent
violence rocketed (Cook and Laub, 1998). The majority of this rise in violence involved
the use of firearms (Zimring, 2000).
A significant proportion of violent and gun crime has been associated with organized
crime and drug trafficking, including disputes between rival gangs and between gangs
and the police (Arias, 2006; Fernandes, 2013; Denyer-Willis, 2015). Nevertheless, about
half of all homicides in Brazil are the outcome of trivial incidents between people who
know each other (ISP, 2006). This is similar to the experience of other countries, for
instance the US (Zimring and Hawkins, 1987, 1997; Zimring, 1993; Squires, 2000;
Bandeira and Bourgois, 2005). Thus, the problem of gun proliferation is not limited to
gun crime between strangers, or between organised criminals and state authorities, but
also has an impact inside the home, within communities and between friends.
The Disarmament Statute
We sometimes think that the way to affect the world of social policy is to
get access to legislators and then persuade them to do the right thing…
[This is] largely limited unless you have engaged the broader public as well.
(Currie, 2007: 178)
Concerned about the magnitude of firearms-related violence in Brazil, law students
from the University of São Paulo launched a disarmament campaign in 1997, Brazil’s
first civilian-originated initiative against gun proliferation. The movement gained media
support, which spread the message for arms control nationally with images of the public
destruction of 1721 voluntarily surrendered guns in São Paulo. The campaign reached
the attention of Congress and over 60 legislative bills on gun control were introduced,
despite many being defeated by gun lobbyists (ISP, 2006).
The Disarmament Statute raised the minimum age for purchasing firearms from 21
to 25, established mandatory psychological and shooting tests, and prohibited civilians
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from carrying a gun in public. It also established an extensive number of gun control
provisions, such as the prohibition of production, sale and use of replicated firearms and
determined that any weapons produced in Brazil must have a safety and identification
system engraved on the gun by the producer.
By 2005, 443,719 firearms had been voluntarily surrendered from civilians for
destruction (Crespo, 2006). The population had rejected nearly half a million firearms
in an attempt to say no to the associated deaths and violence. By 2004 the country
experienced the first drop in gun deaths, reducing 13 percent (Hearn, 2005b; Cerqueira
and de Mello, 2013, 2015; Waiselfisz, 2015). Ultimately, the Statute established that a
national referendum would be held for a public vote on a complete ban on firearms and
ammunition sales to civilians (ISP, 2006).
A number of activists and lobbies organized campaigns throughout the country and
various NGOswere involved in the pro-ban cause. Simultaneously, the USNational Rifle
Association (NRA) announced it would invest US$1million in the pro-gun campaign
(IANSA, 2005a). Rebecca Peters, IANSA’s director, stated ‘if the ban is passed, then I
definitely expect other countries to try the same thing’ (Reel, 2005). Given that half the
world’s small arms manufacturers are in the US (Batchelor, 2001), this may explain why
the NRA believed it had reason to become involved. The NRA perceived the fight against
gun control in terms of ‘domino theory’, whereby other countries would follow suit. Gun
control was a political slippery slope and had to be resisted everywhere it arose, because
gun bans in one country might lead to similar bans in the next. The following sections
examine the factors that may have contributed to the apparent U-turn in popular voting
intentions after the referendum’s campaign.
Campaign Strategy and Funding
According to pro-ban activists interviewed, various celebrities became involved in the
disarmament movement and wanted to volunteer for the cause. At the time, this was
thought to be a great idea as an attempt to influence the public and raise awareness
about disarmament. However, they perceived their campaign to have had no real strat-
egy or single focus. On the other hand, the anti-ban campaign focused on the theme
of self-defence and used ‘fear propaganda’ to promote guns. These tactics drew heav-
ily upon the kind of pro-self-defence propaganda utilised by the NRA in the US. For
example, they played on the fear of crime on the streets, employing discourses such as:
‘responsibility equals protecting your family with guns’, ‘don’t trust politicians who will
take your ability to self-defend away’, ‘protecting the vulnerable – women and children
with guns’.
This hegemonic discourse about security relies on the privatization of responsibility
for crime. While conservatives support individual freedom, leftists advocate gun control
and bestow powers upon the state to rule over individual choice (Kleck, 1991). These
new themes of security, rights and self-defence were successfully imported from America
to Brazilian discourse on gun control. These barriers to the pro-ban campaign were
clearly illustrated in interviews:
We were not in tune with the theme of ‘security’. We used celebrities, but
actors were the last thing we needed. We needed people who were suffering,
people who knew what they were saying. People know that celebrities are
out of threat; they belong to a non-reachable elite, they are out of the reach
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of firearms and it is not their children who die. Around that time, I went to
a funeral of a 22 year-old boy. He was not the son of a celebrity. He was a
builder’s son. (interview, priest and pro-ban activist, 2009)
According to pro-ban activists the disparity in funds for the campaign was also a
major factor for its outcome. One activist argued:
The changes reflected the well-elaborated marketing campaign executed by
gun-lobbyists, funded by the industry they contracted three publicity com-
panies and spent about R$10million, whilst the ‘yes’ campaign had about
R$1million (£300,000) and a shy college-based campaign. (interview, mar-
keting student and pro-ban activist, 2009)
Besides having more funds from the armaments industry, Brazil’s gun lobby had help
from the experienced NRA. In 2003, Charles Cunningham, an NRA lobbyist visited São
Paulo on the invitation of the Brazilian Society for the Defence of Tradition, Family and
Property, a pro-gun group and met privately with gun supporters to discuss strategies
(Hearn, 2005b).
Activists argued that the Brazilian gun-lobby directly translated and used NRA
propaganda materials. They used the statistics and the same narrative as the NRA’s
television adverts in the US. This is especially noticeable as the NRA’s conservative
theme of security and the ‘right to own a gun’ were embedded in campaign discourses
(Hearn, 2005b; Goldstein, 2007; Morton, 2009) at the time of the referendum. Even
gun-lobbyists claimed their success was a result of the media campaign:
We turned the game around from the moment we gained space in the media
to convince the public. (interview, Brazilian gun-lobbyist, congressman and
chief of police, 2010)
The Formulation of the Referendum Question
The referendum’s question was perceived as confusing in Portuguese and misleading:
‘Should the sale of firearms be banned to civilians?’ Because during the disarmament
campaign, there was a lot of talk about ‘saying no to guns’, the key word was ‘no’,
however, for the purposes of the referendum, the wording had to change from ‘no’ to
‘yes’. In order to vote against guns, civilians would need to select ‘yes’ on the ballot.
Activists argued that there was a need to deconstruct the meanings of voting ‘no’ or
‘yes’, but there was not emphasis on this or enough time to do so (Crespo, 2006). As
expressed in the following extract:
If a gun ban had been achieved, surely various countries andmanufacturers,
as well as distributors and merchandisers of guns and ammunition would
have been negatively affected, so a scheme was designed to confuse society
starting from the way the question was formulated. They moved the focus
from the theme of disarmament: ‘yes!’ to the theme of security. They treated
the question as a ‘right’ and option for the right of self-defence, to be armed.
It seemed that ‘yes’ would be yes to gun sales and not to disarmament when
in fact, it was voting ‘no’ that ended up legitimating gun sales. See how
confusing the ideas get? (interview, teacher and pro-ban activist, 2010)
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Indecision and Confusion among Voters
Many pro-ban activists argued that people did not feel prepared to decide on the refer-
endum question. Some thought this decision should have been made by congress, partly
because there was not enough debate time to improve the electorate’s understanding of
their voting options and the implications of their vote:
People did not feel capable of deciding. I often heard people say ‘well, if I
voted in this politician, why can’t he solve this issue?’ [… ] When we finally
achieved the enforcement of the Disarmament Statute, for the referendum to
take place, there were only threemonths left till the vote and just onemonth
of campaigning. People did not understand the subject matter. (interview,
sociologist and pro-ban activist, 2009)
A different interviewee also expressed disappointment in the kind of debate around
the time of the referendum: ‘There was no debate. It was all marketing’ (interview,
pro-ban chief of police, 2010).
The confusion in the understanding of the electorate is not surprising. The gun-lobby
had successfully deployed a binary opposition separating ‘citizens’ from ‘bandits’. This
criminalising rhetoric worked as a process of othering. This has serious implications:
first, it constructs criminals as simply bad, in an essentialist fashion, and ignores their
humanity and potential to change; second, it promotes fear, distrust and loss of hope
in public security. This is one example of Foucault’s notion of ‘dividing practices’ also
referred to as the construction of the ‘criminalised other’ via a process of essentializing
the other (Young, 1999). The rhetoric deployed by gun-lobbyists dichotomised and sep-
arated the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’, by maintaining that bandits (the bad) were in favour
of a disarmed citizenry (as it allowed them to victimise with impunity) and that good
citizens could not rely on public security. The gun lobby’s discourse, which supposed the
existence of the human right to armed self-defence, drew heavily upon a wide range of
pro-gun scholarship in the US that emerged in the last two decades (Waters, 1998; Kleck
and Kates, 2001; Lund, 2006; Stell, 2006).
The pro-ban campaign was backed up by years of research by well-prepared
researchers in NGOs and advocated the promotion of public safety, whereas the
pro-gun campaign had as its ambition the establishment of individual freedom and
personal security. This distinction is critical to an understanding of these compet-
ing dimensions of safety (Squires, 2006, 2008). This issue was illustrated during an
interview with a pro-gun activist:
People started to think in terms of personal freedom and embodied distrust
for the government. I think people started to think about it properly. I don’t
think that prohibiting gun ownership would reduce violence. (interview,
NRA gun lobbyist and UN executive, 2009)
Gun-lobbyists insisted that banning gun sales to civilians would simply leave all the
guns in criminal hands and the police could not protect all citizens at all times. Conse-
quently, they argued that there was a need for ‘good citizens’ to protect themselves, and
that they could do this more effectively with a firearm. The comment below exemplifies
this argument:
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In my 35 years of police experience, I must say that it is impossible for
the police to protect all good citizens, in all areas, at all times. It is then
that I advocate the right to self-defence. (interview, Brazilian gun-lobbyist,
congressman and chief of police, 2010)
Paradoxically, it is precisely the availability of firearms, whether for armed defence or
otherwise, that has accompanied the increase in violence (Bandeira and Bourgois, 2005).
The gun lobby perceived the solution to crime to be robust policing, investing in guns and
enforcing punitive measures. This perspective does not acknowledge methods of crime
control beyond punishment and the criminal justice system, such as socio-economicmea-
sures and programmes of inclusion. As argued by Chevigny (2003: 79), populist political
campaigners run a successful campaign against policy experts by ‘championing a venge-
ful, punitive approach to crime, as contrasted with the more nuanced approach of many
criminologists.’
Corruption Scandals and the Politicization of the Referendum
The infamous Mensalão political scandal emerged in June 2005, where monthly bribes
of R$30,000 (about $12,000) were allegedly paid to parliamentarians to vote in favour
of the president’s projects. The scandal received continuing media attention between
June and October 2005, the same period between the referendum’s approval and the
actual voting date. Critics argued that this resulted in an association of public opinion
between the federal government that supported the ban campaign and the systematic
bribery and corruption issue (Infante, 2005). The referendum began to be seen as a form
of resistance to and demonstration of dislike for parliament and distrust of the political
executive (Crespo, 2006; Goldstein, 2007). Many interviewees from the pro-ban side
argued that the pro-gun campaigners took advantage of this opportunity:
The ‘No’ campaign was a thousand times better than the ‘Yes’. The deciding
factor was that they were very savvy in ‘gluing with super-glue’ the refer-
endum to the government. (interview, volunteer PR and pro-ban activist,
2009)
The referendum was not about guns, but about being against the govern-
ment. People thought it was a way the government had found to mask their
corruption and ‘theft’. I saw many students saying this. (interview, sociolo-
gist and pro-ban activist, 2009)
Corruption and ‘talk’ about corruption have been normalized in Brazil, not only
political corruption but also police corruption (Goldstein, 2007). The rhetoric used by
the NRA and the gun-lobby campaign simply reinforced a common belief in Brazil that
‘criminals have access to guns and will continue to have them, and that the police are
unable to protect ordinary citizens’ (Goldstein, 2007: 38). This is precisely the type of
discourse that gun-lobbyists drew on:
Criminals use illegal guns, not the guns owned by good citizens. Bandits do
not buy guns in shops, they don’t register guns, and neither do they volun-
teer their guns away. The governmental propaganda aimed to convince via
brain-washing that homicides are committed by ordinary people that know
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and live with the victims. This is false. Criminals kill other criminals in traf-
ficking disputes, they kill police at work and defenceless victims. (interview,
Brazilian gun-lobbyist, congressman and chief of police, 2010)
The gun lobby argued that only criminals would have access to guns and would
benefit from the ban as they would know that victims were unarmed, another famil-
iar American theme. Consequently, gun-lobbyists claimed that a gun ban would lead to
increases in burglary and crime altogether. This type of circular argument bears no rela-
tionship to the available research. As critics argued, the implementation of stricter gun
laws in 2003 led to subsequent drops in firearm mortality (Hearn, 2005a; Cerqueira and
deMello, 2013). The gun-lobby’s conspiracy theories of corrupt intentions to disarm the
population (Harcourt, 2004) demonstrate the ways in which the original purpose of the
referendum was diluted and misinterpreted. It is, therefore, important to remember the
civilian origins of the social movement that led to such a radical referendum (CONIC,
2005; ISP, 2006).
The Role of the Electoral Justice System
In Brazil, Justiça Eleitoral or the Electoral Justice system is responsible for all processes
related to elections and voting in the country. It is in charge of monitoring electoral
campaigns and enforcing the law over electoral crime. During the disarmament cam-
paign, the Electoral Justice system prohibited donations to entities or organisations
which received international funding or which benefited from the outcomes of legis-
lation (Crespo, 2006). The pro-ban campaign, which relied on NGOs, was limited by
these regulations, whereas the American NRA was able to play a pivotal role. Activists
argued that this had a significant impact in the ‘yes’ (pro-ban) campaign:
It is not possible to consult the public about an important theme in their
lives such as public security and at the same time disqualify the social move-
ments [NGOs, pressure groups] working on these issues, while, on the other
hand, allowing commercial establishments and private companies to do
whatever they liked, donate, campaign, publish news articles. (interview,
lawyer specialist in electoral law, 2009)
Legislation was against us … They [referring to the gun-lobby] contracted
an entire office of solicitors to stop us … We had no way to defend our-
selves. (interview, volunteer public relations officer and pro-ban activist,
2009)
The electoral justice system treated the referendum as an election campaign even
though it was a public consultation and it is at least arguable that NGOs representing
social movements should not be ruled out of a public debate. It is not likely that they
would have derived profits from the referendum’s result.
The Context for Decision Making
The complexity of the issue of civilian disarmament is exemplified by the different gun
control regimes adopted around the world. The decision to allow the population to be
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armed requires careful consideration in light of the social, political, cultural and eco-
nomic circumstances of the country in question. However, this was never the way that
the issue was going to be resolved in Brazil in 2005: the topic was controversial, the two
sides were passionate about their views and politics and political influence played their
part, as did fear.
Given the deep rooted social inequality, the reality and intensity of urban violence in
Brazil, few social problems are capable of mobilizing the population as much as crim-
inality (Chevigny, 1995; Tavares, 2007). According to Soares (2006b) fear of crime is
part of a constant sentiment that is naturalized at all levels of society; criminality and
fear of crime have, therefore, become embedded in the culture of Brazil. Be it due to
media influence or to soaring violent crime rates, fear of crime affects the behaviour
of individuals and institutions in Brazil. A study by IANSA sets the picture: in Brazil,
94 percent of participants were worried about becoming victims of firearm violence and
51 percent had friends or family who had been victims of gun crime in the previous
five years (Tavares, 2007). In this context, it is perhaps difficult for the population to
make a clear and rational decision between having a country with fewer illegal guns
and potentially less gun-related violence as opposed to giving up the alleged right to
self-defence (with a firearm), as argued by gun-lobby activists.
A significant percentage of the population relied on the media to inform their vot-
ing decision. While not minimizing the power and weight of the media, it is important
to note that spectators are active interpretative agents rather than simply a compli-
ant sponge (Kitzinger, 2004). Spectators interpret media messages in different ways,
depending on their social position in a variety of sense-making communities and on their
contact with alternative discourses. Participants (both pro-gun and the pro-ban) explic-
itly argued that the media campaigns were responsible for the shift in voting intentions
in the referendum. During the first 12 days of the 20-day media campaign, the pro-ban
side gradually lost overall support while the pro-gun campaign started influencing public
opinion (Soares, 2006a).
Most of the pro-gun arguments ultimately implied the ineffectiveness of the police and
the state; which were rooted in beliefs that the solution to Brazil’s crime problems lay
in more civilian armament and the use of force (see, e.g., Klintowitz, 2005). Wacquant
has tried to account for the enthusiasm for US style law and order discourse in Brazil,
but this is just one part of the picture:
Brazil is tempted to import the US-style discourse and policy of ‘zero tol-
erance’ because … they are the indispensable order-maintenance counter-
part to policies of economic deregulation and fiscal austerity adopted by
Latin American countries under the press of international financial agen-
cies. (Wacquant, 2003: 197)
In fact Brazil has moved beyond simply importing the measures of the US penal state
described by Wacquant (2003, 2009); it is also taking up the ‘gun culture’ or ideology,
which is strongly associated with minimalist government and inequality. As Wacquant
notes, this ‘neo-liberal penality is all the more seductive as well as all the more nefarious
when it is applied to countries traversed by deep inequalities of social condition and life
chances’ (Wacquant, 2003: 198).
The principles of neoliberal penality, such as zero tolerance and deterrence, are seduc-
tive to authoritarian thinking precisely because, even though they are ineffective (and
counter-productive) for tackling the underlying problems of urban crime and violence,
‘they are ideally suited to dramatizing publicly their new-found commitment to slay
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the monster of urban crime and because they readily fit the negative stereotypes of
the poor who are everywhere portrayed as the main source of street deviance and vio-
lence’ (Wacquant, 2003: 198, emphasis in original). Yet rather than ‘slaying the monster
of urban crime’, firearm proliferation in Brazil seems far more likely to slay the poor
themselves. Wacquant’s point bears out Garland’s argument that criminal Justice poli-
cies ‘are not chosen because they are known to work’ (2001: 26); rather, in Brazil’s
case, firearms for citizen self-defence reflect both the powerful political interests of the
firearm lobby and an underlying attitude, infused with fear and contempt, which regards
the gun violence epidemic as little more than collateral damage in a daily war against
the criminalised poor.
The conservative agenda that dominated the pro-gun campaign with its focus on per-
sonal security and the individualism of self-defence had no scope to incorporate the more
public agenda of collective security by means of disarmament and reduced gun availabil-
ity. It relied on the construction of offenders as the ‘bad apples’, as the undeserving
‘other’; that rhetoric only required law-enforcement to be more effective in manag-
ing and punishing ‘bandits’. This misinterpretation of offenders serves the interests of
a neoliberal system that causes social inequalities and maintains the poor controlled
through the penal system (Wacquant, 2003).
Brazil’s police force is infamous for corruption and inhumanity (Huggins, 1991;
Penglase, 1996; Chevigny, 2003), as well as being unable to provide protection to com-
munities in which gangs rule. With no safety and no social security, how could the public
have relied on the government for protection? The pro-gun argument of self-defence was
effective in persuading Brazilian society. A milieu riddled with social inequality, corrup-
tion, mistrust, frequent victimization and fear of crime was ideal for those that profit on
the insecurities of the public. This penal chaos is captured by Wacquant’s argument that:
The routine use of lethal violence by the military police and the habitual
recourse of the civilian police to torture … summary executions and unex-
plained ‘disappearances’, all maintain a climate of terror among the popular
classes. (Wacquant, 2003: 199)
Firearm proliferation is sustained by a combination of fear and a neoliberal law and
order discourse. Above all, even in a now supposedly democratic society, the blatant
inefficiency and distrust of the police and ‘the patent incapacity of the courts to enforce
the law encourages all those who can to seek private solutions to the problem of public
insecurity – via fortification into “gated communities”, armed guards, the tolerated and
even encouraged vigilantism of the justiceiros and victims of crime’ (Wacquant, 2003:
200) – and, not least, the carrying of firearms for personal protection. These factors
spread and intensify the violence, which is fuelled by easy access to guns (Wacquant,
2003; Bandeira and Bourgois, 2005).
Conclusion: Lessons to Learn
This article contextualizes and seeks to understand why the gun ban in Brazil failed. The
phrasing of the referendum’s question on the ballot, fear of crime fuelled by the spread of
firearms, highly ideologically driven campaigns, media influence and global powers such
as the NRAwere the main factors to influence the referendum’s result. The article argues
that the gun-lobby’s discourses relied on ideological views, which were dependent on
private methods of security. These views were perpetuated and proliferated in the
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referendum’s campaign with the use of fear propaganda and resulted in a vote against
a gun ban.
This article suggests that there is a need for more gun control. This is problematic,
as in most countries manufacturers and the gun lobby have a close relationship with the
state (Spitzer, 2004). Currently, groups such as the NRA, funded by the gun industry and
its members, effectively promote gun proliferation around the world (Morton, 2009).
The NRA spreads conspiracy theories and has proven to be a successful international
pressure group. So, there is a need to engage the public in the complex debate about
firearms. The Brazilian disarmament campaign demonstrated that the public are capable
of influencing legislators, but it also revealed the powerful influence of the media, which
can misinform spectators.
If Brazil’s population is to trust and rely on methods of public security, police reform
is another pressing issue, requiring a shift from violent dehumanizing policing to intelli-
gent problem-solving policing. Finally, policies of tolerance and peace are paramount in
changing Brazil’s context. What is needed is ‘both intolerance of violence and tolerance
of informal, non-violent economic activity … more negotiation and less suppression’
(Hagedorn, 2005: 164). There is no simple solution to these problems.
Despite the relative success of the Disarmament Statute gun control laws (Cerqueira
and de Mello, 2013), the overall status quo remains unchanged. Firearms were not
banned in the country, they remain accessible and the country still suffers from high
levels of firearm violence, while small but powerful sections of society continue to profit
from the ideologies of a gun culture, leaving behind a trail of blood and injustice. In
this context, learning lessons from the referendum’s experience is timely, as the Brazilian
gun lobby has become more organised and influential, having submitted legal appeals
(law 3722/2012) to reform the disarmament statute legislation and reduce gun control
(Fernandes, Vicente and Silva, 2015; Waiselfisz, 2015).
It has not been my purpose to engage in a detailed exercise of campaigning reform,
institution-building or re-design. Instead, in this article I have set out some of the specific
problems of institutional corruption, fear propaganda, fear of crime and populist puni-
tive agendas and sketched the outlines of a discussion about the politics of gun control.
Such politics, I have argued, should be geared towards less firearm availability, more
control of manufacturers and traders, more humane policing, effective campaign regu-
lation, critical engagement of the public, something I interpret as requiring a range of
mechanisms, operating at different levels, each differently oriented to questions of reduc-
ing mortality rates, equitable resource distribution, and genuinely maximizing citizen
involvement. By such means it might become possible to generate legitimately demo-
cratic and effective gun control and reduce mortality.
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